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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case, we are called upon to determine, among 
other things, the fount and contours of federal common law 
applicable to the assignment of federal antitrust claims and 
the reach of the presumption of timeliness for motions to 
intervene as representatives of a class.  Consistent with the 
Restatement of Contracts and the doctrines undergirding 
federal antitrust law, we hold that an assignment of a federal 
antitrust claim need not be supported by bargained-for 
consideration in order to confer direct purchaser standing on 
an indirect purchaser; such assignment need only be express, 
and that requirement was met here.  We also hold that the 
presumption of timeliness, that is, the presumption that a 
motion to intervene by a proposed class representative is 
timely if filed before the class opt-out date, applies not only 
after the class is certified, as we held in In re Community 
Bank of Northern Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005), 
but also in in the pre-certification context.  Because the 
District Court failed to apply that presumption and the 
intervenors’ motion here was timely considering the totality 
of the circumstances, we conclude the District Court abused 
its discretion in denying their motion to intervene on that 
basis.  Accordingly, we will reverse and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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I. Background 
 Appellants seek to certify and represent a class of 
Class 8 truck purchasers to challenge an alleged conspiracy to 
monopolize among their immediate suppliers and those 
further up the market chain.1  The relevant market can be 
envisioned as a three-layer cake, with parts manufacturers at 
the top, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the 
middle, and Class 8 truck consumers at the base.  Parts 
manufacturers are companies that make component parts of 
trucks, such as the transmissions at issue in this case.  These 
companies sell their products to OEMs, which, in turn, take 
orders from the customers to build trucks customized to the 
customers’ needs.  OEMs offer what are called “data books,” 
which list the various options for each part; the customer 
chooses among the parts and options; and the OEM sources 
the parts from the manufacturers and uses them to build the 
truck then sold to that consumer. 
 Eaton Corporation—a parts manufacturer—has long 
been a near monopolist in the market for supplying Class 8 
truck transmissions.  In 1989, a company called ZF Meritor2 
emerged as a competitor, offering transmissions that truck 
customers could select from the OEMs’ data books.  
                                              
 1 This same alleged conspiracy was the subject of our 
opinion in ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d 
Cir. 2012), where we explained the relevant market in detail.  
As that background is elsewhere available, we provide here a 
more limited overview. 
 
 2 ZF Meritor began as simply “Meritor” in 1989, not 
becoming “ZF Meritor” until a merger in 1999. 
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According to Appellants, Eaton sought to sideline ZF Meritor 
and retain its hold on the market by conspiring with the 
OEMs to oust ZF Meritor from the market.  It purportedly did 
so by entering Long Term Agreements with the OEMs that 
would offer increasingly large rebates on Eaton transmissions 
based on the percentage of transmissions a given OEM 
purchased from Eaton as opposed to ZF Meritor.  The OEMs 
allegedly embraced this plan because, while they would 
benefit directly from rebates, they could pass on any increase 
in the price of Eaton’s transmissions to their customers 
downstream, reaping extra profits without suffering detriment 
from monopoly-level prices.  Per Appellants, the Long Term 
Agreements had their intended effect, ultimately forcing ZF 
Meritor to shutter in 2003 and giving Eaton an iron grip on 
the market for Class 8 truck transmissions. 
 But not without repercussions.  In 2006, ZF Meritor 
sued Eaton for antitrust violations and won.  See ZF Meritor, 
LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming 
the jury’s verdict against Eaton).  Separately, a group of 
indirect purchasers (i.e., customers who bought trucks from 
OEMs’ immediate customers) brought a class action against 
Eaton; that case was dismissed after the district court 
undertook a full class certification analysis pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, though an appeal is 
pending.  See generally In re Class 8 Transmission Indirect 
Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 339 (D. Del. 
2015).  And we now confront on appeal the suit brought on 
behalf of the OEMs’ customers—i.e., “direct purchasers” of 
the Class 8 trucks—against both the OEMs and Eaton for 
damages arising from the alleged monopolization 
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conspiracy.3  Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d 487, 
492 (D.N.J. 2015). 
                                              
 3 Specifically, Appellants brought a monopolization 
claim against Eaton under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2, and three claims against both Eaton and the OEMs: a 
conspiracy to monopolize claim, id., and two claims for 
entering exclusionary contracts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14.  
Importantly, Appellants may still be characterized as “direct 
purchasers” in relation to Eaton for purposes of this suit, even 
though the OEMs exist as middlemen between Eaton and 
Appellants.  In 2010, Appellees filed motions to dismiss the 
case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in part 
for lack of statutory standing, arguing that because the 
putative class representatives (then Wallach and Tauro) did 
not directly purchase trucks from Eaton, they lacked standing 
under the so-called “direct purchaser rule.”  See Ill. Brick Co. 
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (allowing antitrust suits for 
damages only by plaintiffs who directly purchased items from 
the alleged violator).  The District Court rejected this 
argument, determining that Appellants had statutory standing 
to sue under the limited co-conspirator exception to the direct 
purchaser rule, which allows an entity to sue its supplier and 
its supplier’s supplier if (1) it sues both at once, and (2) the 
immediate supplier (i.e., the middleman) was so wrapped up 
in the conspiracy that it would be barred from seeking 
antitrust relief against the top-level supplier in a suit of its 
own.  Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 814 F. Supp. 2d 428 (D.N.J. 
2011); see also Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply 
Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 258-60 (3d Cir. 2010); Howard Hess 
Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 378-84 
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 Appellants here fall into two categories, each of which 
presents a different issue on appeal: those that brought suit as 
putative class representatives and those seeking to intervene 
to serve in that role.  In the first group, the relevant party for 
purposes of appeal is Tauro Brothers Trucking Company 
(“Tauro”), the putative class representative that the District 
Court determined lacked standing.4  Tauro never directly 
purchased a Class 8 truck from the OEMs, but rather 
purchased trucks from R&R—a company that was a direct 
customer of the OEMs and that expressly assigned Tauro its 
direct purchaser antitrust claims stemming from the alleged 
conspiracy between the OEMs and Eaton.5  Before the 
District Court, Appellees challenged the propriety and effect 
of this assignment, urging that it is invalid for lack of 
bargained-for consideration and that Tauro lacks standing to 
                                                                                                     
(3d Cir. 2005).  Appellees do not challenge this ruling on 
appeal. 
 
 4 Performance Transportation Services, Inc. (PTS), a 
direct customer of the OEMs and a former putative class 
representative in this case, is in bankruptcy and is represented 
by Mark Wallach as its Chapter 7 Trustee.  While this case 
bears Wallach’s name, PTS no longer seeks to represent the 
putative class and was dropped as a litigant in the case when 
the putative class redefined itself in briefing before the 
District Court. 
 
 5 It is beyond dispute that a validly assigned antitrust 
claim can give direct purchaser standing to an indirect 
purchaser.  See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Litig. State of Wash., 
632 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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bring this suit or serve as a class representative.  The District 
Court agreed and dismissed Tauro from the suit. 
 In the second group are Toledo Mack Sales and 
Service, Inc. and JJRS, LLC, both of which directly 
purchased trucks from the OEMs.  Concerned after Appellees 
sought to dismiss Tauro for lack of standing that Tauro could 
be dropped from the suit, thereby leaving no named 
representative, Toledo Mack and JJRS filed motions under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 to intervene as putative 
class representatives.6  The District Court denied those 
motions, holding that neither entity had moved to intervene in 
a timely manner. 
Having ejected the named plaintiff on standing 
grounds and foreclosed intervention by Toledo Mack and 
JJRS, the District Court dismissed the case in its entirety on 
August 31, 2015, concluding that the motion for class 
certification must be denied for want of a case or controversy 
necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction under Article III of 
the United States Constitution.  On appeal, Appellants argue 
that (1) consideration is not required for a valid assignment of 
antitrust claims, and (2) the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying Toledo Mack and JJRS’s motions to 
intervene.  For the reasons that follow, we agree with these 
                                              
 6 Toledo Mack and JJRS’s motions to intervene were 
brought as “of [r]ight,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and, in the 
alternative, “[p]ermissive[ly],” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 
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arguments and conclude that the case should be remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 
II. Standards of Review8 
 We first review the District Court’s decision that 
Tauro lacked standing9 de novo, with deference to its factual 
                                              
 7 Appellants argue, in the alternative, that if 
consideration is required, R&R’s assignment was supported 
by such consideration.  Because we conclude consideration is 
not required, we do not reach this alternative argument and do 
not opine on the District Court’s disposition of it. 
 
 8 The District Court had jurisdiction over Appellants’ 
antitrust claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 15(a) and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s conclusions. 
 
 9 The standing inquiry in this case centers on the 
validity of R&R’s assignment of its antitrust claim to Tauro.  
The District Court effectively entertained a 12(b)(1) motion 
on this question and treated it as a question of Article III 
standing.  But because the assignment is relevant to whether 
Appellants satisfy the direct purchaser rule, its validity is a 
question of statutory standing, not Article III standing.  
Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., --- F.3d ---, No. 15-
3289, 2016 WL 4651381, at *5-6 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 2016).  
Unlike Article III standing, statutory standing is inherently 
non-jurisdictional, and—contrary to Appellants’ assessment 
at oral argument, Oral Arg. Tr. 18—challenges to it should be 
brought by way of a 12(b)(6) motion, a summary judgment 
motion, or arguments on the merits—not by way of a 12(b)(1) 
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findings unless clearly erroneous.  White-Squire v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review 
the District Court’s denial of Toledo Mack and JJRS’s Rule 
24 motions as untimely for abuse of discretion, Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 
1979), which occurs where a “district court’s decision rests 
                                                                                                     
motion.  See id. at *4; see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014).   
 
 We also disagree with the parties’ suggestion at oral 
argument that we can infer the District Court addressed the 
validity of the assignment as a matter of statutory standing, 
rather than Article III standing.  Oral Arg. Tr. 18, 36.  Such 
an inference is not plausible.  The District Court recited and 
employed the doctrinal standard applicable to questions of 
subject matter jurisdiction, foreclosing the possibility that it 
was treating the issue as a non-jurisdictional question of 
statutory standing.  Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 125 F. Supp. 3d 
487, 491-92 (D.N.J. 2015).  Moreover, because Appellees 
brought a 12(b)(6) motion in 2011, see Wallach, 814 F. Supp. 
2d at 432, they were prohibited under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(g)(2) from bringing their current challenge to 
Tauro’s statutory standing as a 12(b)(6) motion in 2014, 
accord Leyse, 804 F.3d at 320-21.  Despite the District 
Court’s procedural error in entertaining Appellees’ statutory 
standing challenge as a 12(b)(1) Article III challenge, 
however, Appellants failed to object in the District Court or in 
their briefs on appeal, and, at oral argument, asserted that the 
District Court acted properly, Oral Arg. Tr. 17-19.  
Accordingly, we deem any such challenge waived and 
address the statutory standing question on the merits. 
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upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact,” In re Gen. 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 
55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995) (hereinafter “In re GM 
Corp.”) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 
F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)).10 
                                              
 10 While we have said that denials of motions to 
intervene as of right and by permission under Rule 24 for 
untimeliness are both reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, 
Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1995) (reciting standard for 
motions to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)); Del. Valley 
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Commonwealth of Pa., 674 
F.2d 970, 974 (3d Cir. 1982) (same for motions to intervene 
by permission per Rule 24(b)), we have also noted that our 
review of denials of motions to intervene as of right under 
Rule 24(a) generally “is more stringent than the abuse of 
discretion review accorded to denials of motions for 
permissive intervention,” meaning we will reverse if the 
district court “has applied an improper legal standard or 
reached a decision that we are confident is incorrect.”  Harris 
v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United 
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 992 
(2d Cir. 1984)).  We need not delve into how this heightened 
standard might affect the “abuse of discretion” relevant to the 
District Court’s denial of the intervention motions here 
because we conclude the District Court abused its discretion 
even under the more forgiving standard generally applicable 
to Rule 24(b) motions.  See Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 
957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that rulings 
on Rule 24(b) motions are reviewed more deferentially). 
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III. Tauro’s Standing 
 Tauro’s statutory standing to serve as a named 
representative of the putative class of direct purchasers of the 
OEMs’ Class 8 trucks hinges on the validity of R&R’s 
assignment of such direct purchaser claims to Tauro, and in 
particular whether the assignment of a federal antitrust claim 
requires consideration.  To answer that question, we must 
ascertain the federal common law principles that govern such 
assignments and then apply those principles to the case at 
hand.11 
                                                                                                     
 
11 We acknowledge that the term and concept of “federal 
common law” may strike some as anathema to federal court 
jurisprudence in the wake of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), but in some areas of the law, marked by 
pressing interests of the United States or by broad 
congressional statutes empowering federal courts to make 
governing rules of law, so-called “federal common law” still 
exists to provide direction, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-44 (1981).  Federal 
antitrust law historically has been one such area.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
688 (1978).  But cf. Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641-45 
(indicating that while federal common law applies to some 
components of antitrust law, it does not apply to remedial 
provisions that Congress described with particularity).  Here, 
we put aside the doctrinal debates that could be had because 
we are bound by our precedent, which identifies federal 
common law as the governing principle for assessing the 
validity of an assignment of a federal antitrust claim.  
Gulfstream III Assocs. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 
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A. Guiding Principles 
 By imposing the “direct purchaser” rule on antitrust 
claims and providing that only entities that purchase goods 
directly from alleged antitrust violators have statutory 
standing to bring a lawsuit for damages, the Supreme Court 
sought to avoid the complications that would flow from 
allowing suits by indirect purchasers.  See generally Ill. Brick 
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  The Court observed that 
such indirect purchaser suits would force courts to ascertain 
how much of the supracompetitive prices charged by the 
violator were passed from the direct purchaser to indirect 
purchasers down the market chain, and concluded that “the 
antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by 
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct 
purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially 
affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could 
show was absorbed by it.”  Id. at 735.  
 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court 
elucidated three policy rationales, each of which is relevant to 
our assessment of whether the assignment of an antitrust 
claim necessitates bargained-for consideration.  Specifically, 
the Court expressed concern regarding: (1) the difficulty 
courts (and litigants) would have in parsing how much of the 
harm caused by supracompetitive prices charged by an 
antitrust violator was incurred by the direct purchaser as 
opposed to being passed down to indirect purchasers, id. at 
731-32, 741-44; (2) the possibility that multiple lawsuits 
could result in inconsistent adjudications of liability or could 
                                                                                                     
F.2d 425, 437 (3d Cir. 1993) (Greenberg, J., concurring and 
speaking for the majority). 
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result in an antitrust violator paying more than the injury it 
actually inflicted once both direct and indirect purchasers 
obtained recovery, id. at 730-31; and (3) the deleterious effect 
that the combination of uncertainty around damages and the 
likelihood that each individual indirect purchaser’s share of 
damages would be small would have on the incentive for 
private parties to initiate suits, id. at 745-47.  We succinctly 
distilled these rationales in Gulfstream III Assocs. v. 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., explaining that Illinois Brick’s 
direct purchaser rule seeks to counteract “the difficulty of 
analyzing pricing decisions, the risk of multiple liability for 
defendants, and the weakening of private antitrust 
enforcement that might result from splitting damages for 
overcharges among direct and indirect purchasers.”  995 F.2d 
425, 439 (3d Cir. 1993) (Greenberg, J., concurring and 
speaking for the majority). 
 Of particular relevance to this case, an indirect 
purchaser may step into the shoes of a direct purchaser and 
bring an antitrust suit in that capacity if it receives a valid 
assignment of a direct purchaser’s antitrust claims.  
Gulfstream, 995 F.2d at 437-40; In re Fine Paper Litig. State 
of Wash., 632 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3d Cir. 1980).  We have long 
required that such assignments be express, Gulfstream, 995 
F.2d at 437-39, explaining that, consistent with the rationales 
from Illinois Brick, that requirement ensures that only one 
party has the authority to bring suit, that the damages 
calculations remain relatively straightforward, and that we do 
not divvy up damages to the point of reducing the incentive to 
bring private antitrust suits in the first place, Gulfstream, 995 
F.2d at 439-40.   
 At issue in this case, however, is not whether the 
assignment was express.  Rather, we are asked to determine 
18 
 
whether an assignment of a federal antitrust claim must also 
reflect consideration to be valid.  Gulfstream makes clear that, 
in answering that question, we must apply federal common 
law, as opposed to the law of the state, for two reasons: first, 
to ensure the rules governing assignments of federal antitrust 
claims accord with the “overall purposes of the antitrust 
statutes,” and second, to avoid a patchwork of “differing state 
law standards, because such assignments may implicate the 
‘direct purchaser’ rule.”  Id. at 438.  But neither the Supreme 
Court nor our Court has defined the federal common law 
governing consideration for the assignment of federal 
antitrust claims.  Thus, we must do so before we can apply it 
to the assignment at issue in this case—an undertaking that 
requires us first to ascertain the appropriate sources of 
authority for federal common law in this context. 
B. Source of Federal Common Law 
 Given that different authorities point to different 
outcomes, it is not surprising that the parties are at 
loggerheads over which we should consider.  Appellees 
suggest that we ignore federal common law and simply apply 
the law of the state in which the assignment was made, or, in 
the alternative, that federal common law requires us to 
conduct what amounts to a fifty-state survey of the rules 
governing assignments in each state and then apply the most 
common rule.  In contrast, Appellants urge that we apply the 
Second Restatement of Contracts, which they contend does 
not require consideration for a valid assignment. 
 We can dispense with Appellees’ proposed alternatives 
in short order: one contravenes our case law and the other is 
unworkable.  Appellees’ proposal that we apply the law of the 
state in which the assignment was made is one we have 
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expressly rejected in the past for reasons that are just as sound 
today.  As we observed in Gulfstream, “assignments of 
antitrust claims cannot appropriately be left to determination 
under possibly differing state law standards.”  995 F.2d at 
438.  There, we declined to apply state law, explaining that 
because “federal common law governs the assignment of an 
antitrust cause of action, there is no issue as to what state’s 
law would apply.”  Id. at 437 n.1.   
 We likewise reject Appellees’ fifty-state survey 
approach as inefficient, unreliable, and subject to 
manipulation.  In practice, it would have litigants and courts 
reinvent the wheel for every contract-related question arising 
under federal common law by conducting nationwide surveys 
and attempting to characterize the vagaries of state law in 
existence at any given time.  The inconsistent results would 
not only generate uncertainty for would-be assignors and 
consternation for courts attempting to apply precedent, but 
also would run contrary to the twin rationales we identified in 
Gulfstream for applying federal common law to antitrust 
claim assignments in the first place—ensuring the law 
accords with the “overall purposes of the antitrust statutes” 
and avoiding a patchwork of standards.  Id. at 438.12 
                                              
 12 Appellees’ reliance on In re Columbia Gas Systems 
Inc., 997 F.3d 1039, 1055 (3d Cir. 1993), for the proposition 
that we hew closely to state law so as to protect litigants’ 
“commercial expectations” reflects, at best, a misreading of 
that case.  The discussion Appellees cite was our recitation of 
the Supreme Court’s test for ascertaining when to apply 
federal common law in the first instance, id. (citing United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-78 (1979)), 
not a test for how to fashion federal common law thereafter.  
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 Indeed, this appeal is illustrative of the shortcomings 
of this approach, with both sides having submitted lengthy 
and dueling appendices that purport to catalogue the 
applicable rule for each state with contradictory results.  
Moreover, while the parties and their able counsel here had 
the resources to undertake this laborious task, for some 
assignees, such a project may prove a disincentive to bringing 
suit—one of the very hazards the Supreme Court sought to 
avoid in adopting the direct purchaser rule.  Ill. Brick, 431 
U.S. at 745-47. 
 In contrast, Appellants’ proposal that we look to the 
Restatement of Contracts as a starting point for fashioning 
rules of federal common law finds support in our case law 
and the twin aims of Gulfstream.  As the American Law 
Institute explained when it first launched the Restatement of 
Contracts in 1932, “the Restatement of this and other 
subjects” was designed to serve “as prima facie a correct 
statement of what may be termed the general common law of 
the United States,” notwithstanding “instances in which the 
law in one or more States may vary from the law stated in a 
particular section.”  Restatement (First) of Contracts, 
Introduction (Am. Law Inst. 1932).  And in the decades since, 
that aspiration has been realized with the Restatement 
functioning not only as an authoritative fifty-state survey of 
contract law, offering a consistent point of reference to parties 
and courts, but also as a proposed “correct statement,” 
                                                                                                     
Here, Gulfstream already dictates that we apply federal 
common law, rendering the considerations in Columbia Gas 
Systems inapposite. 
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reflecting a synthesis and analysis of that law and the 
consensus of the states.13 
 For those reasons, we have looked to the Restatement 
in the past when applying the federal common law of 
contracts generally, and the law of antitrust assignments 
specifically.  In Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 
91 F.3d 515, 525-26 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1996), for example, we 
applied the federal common law of contracts in a suit brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cited to the Restatement (Second) 
                                              
 13 Indeed, the very cases upon which Appellees rely to 
advance their fifty-state survey approach cut in favor of 
applying the Restatement.  As Appellees note, in Smith Land 
& Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d 
Cir. 1988), we observed that “[t]he general doctrine of 
successor liability in operation in most states should guide 
the” district court in defining the federal common law 
relevant to that case on remand.  While we left it to the 
district court to make that determination in the first instance, 
we did discuss the general precepts of successor liability and, 
in doing so, referenced only treatises on corporate law, id. at 
91, close cousins of the Restatement.  Moreover, while 
Appellees cite to a recent Fifth Circuit case in which the court 
described its application of the federal common law of 
contracts as adhering to “the core principles of the common 
law of contracts that are in force in most states,” Excel 
Willowbrook, L.L.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 
758 F.3d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smith v. United 
States, 328 F.3d 760, 767 (5th Cir. 2003)), the court went on 
to identify those very principles by citing directly to the 
Restatement of Contracts, id. at 597 n.8. 
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of Contracts for the proposition that the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing exists at federal common law.  And in In re 
Fine Paper Litigation, we concluded that the Restatement of 
Contracts was “in accord” with the “general law” applicable 
to assessing the effect of one party’s assignment of its 
antitrust claims to another.  632 F.2d at 1091.14 
Using the Restatement as a guidepost to define federal 
common law concerning the validity of assignments of 
antitrust claims also comports with one of the twin aims of 
Gulfstream: promoting national uniformity.  995 F.2d at 438.  
The Restatement eliminates the risk of courts reaching 
inconsistent conclusions about the consensus of state law, 
supplants the need for a would-be assignor or assignee to 
conduct her own fifty-state survey before assigning an 
antitrust claim to ensure it will be enforceable in federal 
court, and sets a baseline from which litigants may operate 
when challenging or defending the validity of such an 
assignment.  This state of affairs is exactly what Gulfstream 
envisioned a federal rule would provide.  
                                              
 14 Rather than consider the Restatement or the proper 
source of federal common law, the District Court noted that 
In re Fine Paper Litigation itself cited to a district court case 
called Mercu-Ray Industries, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 392 F. 
Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 508 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1974), 
which posited that consideration may be relevant to the 
assignment of an antitrust claim; upon inspection, however, 
the district court in that case merely noted that issues such as 
the giving of consideration were not even challenged in that 
case.  In other words, Mercu-Ray Industries sheds no light on 
the federal common law of contracts. 
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 In sum, we agree with Appellants that the Restatement 
carries persuasive force in defining our federal common law, 
but we also caution that it serves only as a starting point.  
Gulfstream instructs not only that we avoid a patchwork of 
state standards, but also that we craft federal common law 
that pursues the “overall purposes of the antitrust statutes.”  
Id.  For that reason, before adopting the Restatement’s 
approach to a given legal question as federal common law, we 
must confirm that the proposed rule comports with the 
underlying purpose and goals of federal antitrust law as 
outlined in Illinois Brick.15  We thus turn to the Restatement 
and the policy rationales undergirding the direct purchaser 
rule to determine whether bargained-for consideration is 
required for an assignment of an antitrust claim to have legal 
effect. 
C. Defining Federal Common Law 
 We begin with the Restatement.  Consistent with 
Gulfstream’s requirement that an “intention” to assign a 
federal antitrust claim be manifested expressly, 995 F.3d at 
438-39, the Restatement states: “It is essential to an 
assignment of a right that the obligee manifest an intention to 
transfer the right to another person . . . .”  Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 324 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).  And in 
discussing “Assignments and Delegation,” the Second 
                                              
 15 We also recognize that the Restatement may lose 
some of its persuasive force if it can be demonstrated that 
there has been a fundamental shift in the status of the law on a 
given topic in the years since the Second Restatement’s 
publication in 1981.  We have not detected any such tectonic 
shift in the law of assignments at issue in this case. 
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Restatement expressly addresses gratuitous assignments—
that is, assignments given without consideration.16  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 332.  Specifically, it 
provides: “Unless a contrary intention is manifested, a 
gratuitous assignment is irrevocable if . . . the assignment is 
in writing.” Id.  In other words, so long as an assignment is 
written and express, it is valid under the Restatement, even 
absent consideration. 
 Appellees object that the Second Restatement’s 
discussion of assignments is “limited to rights, duties, and 
conditions arising under a contract or for breach of a 
contract” such as “debts, rights to non-monetary performance 
and rights to damages and other contractual remedies,” and 
does not extend to what were historically known as “choses in 
action,” which include “debts of all kinds, tort claims, and 
rights to recover ownership or possession of real or personal 
property”—i.e., non-contractual causes of action.  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 316 & cmt. a (“The 
                                              
 16 Appellees’ strained argument that “gratuitous” and 
“without consideration” are inherently different is foreclosed 
by the Restatement’s description of a gratuitous assignment, 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 332 (defining a 
gratuitous assignment as any assignment “unless it is given or 
taken . . . in exchange for a performance or return promise 
that would be consideration for a promise”), and by the 
definition of “gratuitous” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Black’s 
Law Dictionary 143, 816 (10th ed. 2009) (defining 
“gratuitous” as “given without consideration in circumstances 
that do not otherwise impose a duty” and “gratuitous 
assignment” as “[a]n assignment not given for value”). 
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rules stated here may have some application to non-
contractual choses in action, but the transfer of non-
contractual rights is beyond the scope of the Restatement of 
this Subject.”). 
 The Restatement itself, however, makes clear that this 
limitation is based on an antiquated distinction between 
contractual rights and choses in action that no longer has a 
significant effect on the common law.  In § 317, which 
defines “what can be assigned or delegated,” the Restatement 
explains that “the historical common-law rule that a chose in 
action could not be assigned has largely disappeared.”  Id. 
§ 317 cmt. c; accord id. Chapter 15 Introductory Note (“The 
historic rule in the common-rule courts of England was that a 
‘chose in action’ could not be assigned.  The scope of that 
rule was progressively narrowed . . . . Little remains of it 
today.”).  Moreover, while not citing the Restatement for this 
purpose, we similarly noted in In re Fine Paper Litigation, 
which dealt with the assignment of an antitrust claim, that 
“[a]lthough the common law did not favor the assignment of 
causes of action, by and large that attitude has been 
overcome.”  632 F.2d at 1090.  Thus, what Appellees attempt 
to erect as a historical and definitional roadblock, we resolve 
with a short detour, concluding that the Second Restatement 
remains the most persuasive authority for assessing whether 
assignment of an antitrust claim requires consideration. 
 Having concluded that it does not, we proceed to 
consider whether such a rule comports with the underlying 
purposes of antitrust law generally and the doctrine of direct 
purchaser standing specifically.  See Gulfstream, 995 F.2d at 
438.  Illinois Brick directs us to prioritize three goals with 
regard to direct purchaser standing: avoiding duplicitous 
litigation, streamlining damages calculations, and preventing 
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disincentives for private antitrust suits.  431 U.S. at 730-32, 
745-47.  While our requirement that assignments of federal 
antitrust claims be express advances these goals, see 
Gulfstream, 995 F.2d at 440, requiring consideration does 
not.  As such, adopting the Restatement rule as our federal 
common law rule in this context is in line with the “overall 
purposes of the antitrust statutes.”  Id. at 438.  
 Conversely, requiring consideration for the assignment 
of a federal antitrust claim could discourage private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws in derogation of Illinois 
Brick.  Part of creating incentives for private antitrust suits is 
making federal courts a welcome forum for such litigation, 
and erecting the barrier of consideration threatens to shut out 
otherwise meritorious suits from resolution.  True, in some 
circumstances, consideration could spur such private suits 
because an assignee who pays valuable consideration for the 
right to sue might be more likely to actually bring suit in 
order to recoup its investment.  But in situations like the one 
at issue in this case, if a direct purchaser is uninterested in 
pursuing its claims, whether because it deems them valueless 
or because it cannot afford the expense of litigation, an 
otherwise willing and interested assignee might be 
discouraged from pursuing the suit in the direct purchaser’s 
stead if it were required to provide consideration.  Here, for 
example, the record reflects that R&R assigned its antitrust 
claim to Tauro in part because it believed—in error—that 
because it had sold its trucks to Tauro, it no longer had any 
claim itself.  Had R&R not assigned its claim, it is far from 
clear that it ever would have pursued its direct purchaser 
claims.  In short, because requiring consideration could 
hinder the private enforcement of antitrust laws, that rule 
would not accord with the goals Illinois Brick. 
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 Appellees counter that our requirement in Gulfstream 
that assignments be express was intended to “create[] an 
additional obstacle for assigning direct-purchaser antitrust 
claims,” and, as a result, it would “flout the antitrust policy 
considerations animating Gulfstream’s holding” to allow 
assignments to proceed absent consideration by “mak[ing] it 
easier for a direct purchaser to assign its claims.”  Appellees’ 
Br. 20.  Gulfstream, however, is not such a blunt tool.  We 
imposed the “express assignment” requirement in that case 
not to signal that courts should erect as many hurdles to 
assigning antitrust claims as possible, but rather in an effort to 
bring our case law in line with the rationales underlying 
Illinois Brick.  See 995 F.2d at 438-40.  Specifically, we 
reasoned that an effective assignment must directly reference 
antitrust claims in order to ensure that any transfer of direct 
purchaser status is crystal clear, thereby “eliminat[ing] any 
problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability.”  Id. at 
440.  While requiring an express assignment therefore 
advances the Supreme Court’s goal to prevent duplicative 
liability (and, in so doing, advances another Illinois Brick 
goal: streamlining damages calculations), we are not 
persuaded that requiring the parties to an assignment to 
exchange consideration has the same effect.  
 On the contrary, while Appellees point out the 
possibility of duplicitous liability in federal and state courts if 
federal common law does not require consideration yet state 
law does, their proposed requirement of consideration only 
gives rise to the mirror image of that same problem—i.e., an 
assignment given with consideration in a state that does not 
require consideration would empower an assignee to bring a 
state antitrust claim and an assignor to bring any federal 
claims.  Our disposition today thus does not eliminate the 
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possibility that an assignment in some instances will be valid 
for federal but not for state claims, but that is a necessary 
consequence of our federalist system of government, and the 
resolution we adopt better comports with the goals of federal 
antitrust law.  Our task, after all, is to create a federal rule 
applicable regardless of the assignment’s state of origin.  If 
we are constrained to rules that in no way impact or depart 
from state law, then federal common law would simply track 
state law—an outcome foreclosed by Gulfstream’s 
exhortation to national uniformity. 
 In sum, we conclude that consideration has little role 
to play in advancing the goals of Illinois Brick and requiring 
it could affirmatively undermine one of them by, in certain 
circumstances, discouraging private enforcement of the 
federal antitrust laws.  We therefore hold, consistent with the 
Second Restatement of Contracts, that consideration is not 
required under federal common law to give effect to an 
otherwise express assignment. 
D. Applying Federal Common Law 
 All that remains as to this issue is the simple matter of 
applying the federal common law we announce today to the 
facts of this case.  Here, there is no dispute that R&R’s 
assignment of its antitrust claims to Tauro was both written 
and express, meaning that it is valid with or without 
consideration.17  Consequently, the District Court erred in 
                                              
17 The relevant portion of the written assignment at 
issue in this case reads: 
 
R&R hereby conveys, assigns and transfers to 
Tauro all rights, title and interest in and to all 
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concluding the absence of consideration invalidated the 
assignment upon which Tauros’ standing was predicated.  
Accordingly, we will reverse its dismissal of Tauro for lack of 
standing and its denial of the motion for class certification for 
lack of a named class representative. 
IV. Timeliness of Proposed Intervenor’s Motions to 
Intervene 
 We now shift gears to consider the second issue on 
appeal: Toledo Mack and JJRS’s motions to intervene.  With 
the specter of the putative class losing its named 
representatives, direct purchasers Toledo Mack and JJRS 
filed motions to intervene as representatives of the putative 
class both as a matter of right and permissively, pursuant to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and 24(b), 
respectively.  The District Court denied these motions as 
untimely, concluding that, despite the motions having been 
filed only two months after Appellees first asked the District 
Court to dismiss Tauro for lack of standing, interrogatories 
and depositions posed to Tauro months earlier should have 
put Toledo Mack and JJRS on notice of the potential for 
                                                                                                     
causes of action it may have against 
Defendants, under the antitrust laws of the 
United States or of any State, arising out of or 
relating to R&R’s purchases . . . of vehicles 
containing Class 8 transmissions which were 
subsequently resold to Tauro.  This assignment 
includes R&R’s status as a direct purchaser of 
all vehicles containing Class 8 
transmissions . . . . 
 
J.A. 137 (emphasis added). 
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dismissal of the class certification motion and triggered 
intervention motions at that time.  We agree with Toledo 
Mack and JJRS that the District Court’s denial of their 
motions to intervene was an abuse of discretion.   
A district court’s timeliness inquiry for both types of 
Rule 24 motions requires considering the totality of the 
circumstances arising from three factors: “(1) the stage of the 
proceeding; (2) the prejudice that delay may cause the parties; 
and (3) the reason for the delay.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 
418 F.3d 277, 314 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Fine Paper Antitrust 
Litig., 695 F.2d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1982) (treating the 
timeliness inquiry the same for both types of Rule 24 
motions).  These three factors are necessarily bound up in one 
another, see, e.g., Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n v. Dave 
Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 370 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“[T]he stage of the proceeding is inherently tied to the 
question of the prejudice the delay in intervention may cause 
to the parties already involved.”), and we maintain “a general 
reluctance to dispose of a motion to intervene as of right on 
untimeliness grounds because the would-be intervenor 
actually may be seriously harmed if not allowed to 
intervene,” Benjamin ex rel. Yock v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of 
Pa., 701 F.3d 938, 949 (3d Cir. 2012). 
We also have recognized a presumption of timeliness 
for intervention motions filed by purported class members—
at least where the class has been certified and before the 
court-appointed opt-out deadline has passed, In re Cmty. 
Bank, 418 F.3d at 314, although we have not had occasion 
before today to opine whether that presumption applies pre-
certification as well.  The presumption, in any event, is not 
dispositive, and may be rebutted by a contrary determination 
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under the totality of the factors described above.  See In re 
Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 312-13 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Appellants make two arguments as to why the District 
Court abused its discretion in finding their motions untimely.  
First, they urge that the District Court should have applied the 
presumption of timeliness in this case, even though the 
putative class had not yet been certified.  Second, they argue 
that the District Court erred in its application of the three 
timeliness factors, and had it properly applied them in the 
context of the presumption, it could not have discarded their 
motions as untimely.  We are in agreement.18 
                                              
 18 Our jurisprudence requires a district court to 
consider four factors when ruling on a Rule 24(a)(2) motion: 
whether “(1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the 
applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) the 
interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical matter by 
the disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not 
adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation.”  
Harris, 820 F.2d at 596.  Because Appellees did not dispute 
the latter three factors, the District Court disposed of both the 
intervenors’ motions solely on the timeliness factor.  Wallach, 
125 F. Supp. 3d at 495.  Timeliness is thus the only issue 
presented to us on appeal.  Although it may be that Toledo 
Mack and JJRS opt to withdraw their motions to intervene in 
view of Tauro’s standing to proceed as a class representative, 
should they choose to persist in their motions and dispute the 
remaining factors on remand, nothing in our opinion should 
be taken to suggest that the District Court may not take these 
factors into account in ruling on the Rule 24 motions.   
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A. Procedural History 
We recount the procedural history of this case in some 
detail only because it is necessary for our review of the 
District Court’s denial of the motions to intervene.  After it 
commenced and Tauro became a named representative in 
2010, this case wound its way through several years of 
litigation, resulting in over 2.5 million pages of discovery.   
In August 2014, Appellees served interrogatories on 
Tauro that asked, among many other things, about the nature 
of the assignment of R&R’s direct purchaser claim, and in 
November 2014, Appellees conducted related depositions.  
The goal of the assignment-related questions was to ascertain 
whether Tauro and R&R exchanged bargained-for 
consideration for the assignment in 2010.  Appellees urge that 
these interrogatories and depositions put Tauro on notice that 
its standing in the case—predicated on a valid assignment of 
R&R’s claim—was in jeopardy.  Also in November 2014, 
Appellants filed a Rule 23 motion for class certification, and 
the District Court scheduled evidentiary hearings for the 
following March. 
 In early January 2015, Appellees submitted a letter to 
the District Court seeking leave to file a motion to dismiss the 
case for lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) based on their conclusion that R&R’s 
assignment of its antitrust claims was ineffective for lack of 
consideration.  The District Court denied that request two 
weeks later, and instructed Appellees to present their standing 
arguments in their response brief to Appellants’ motion for 
class certification.  Appellees submitted that response brief 
two days later, which addressed both their standing and class 
certification arguments. 
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 On March 6, 2015, Tauro filed its reply brief to 
Appellees’ brief on class certification and standing, which 
also redefined the class to drop PTS from the case.  On the 
same day, concerned at this point that Tauro could be ousted 
and leave the suit without any named representative, Tauro’s 
attorney filed a Rule 24 motion on behalf of Toledo Mack, 
seeking to intervene as a putative class representative.  On 
March 24, 2015, the same attorney filed an analogous motion 
on JJRS’s behalf, and the District Court held a hearing on all 
of the relevant motions the following day.  By this point, 
discovery had closed, and the deadline for joinder had passed 
over a year earlier.  The District Court thereafter denied the 
motions to intervene as untimely.  Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d 
at 496. 
B. Presumption of Timeliness 
 Appellants protest that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the presumption of timeliness announced in 
In re Community Bank does not apply to would-be 
intervenors where a class has yet to be certified and notice 
containing an opt-out date has yet to be mailed to the putative 
class members.19  See Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 495 n.9.  
While it is true that we fashioned this rebuttable presumption 
                                              
 19 While we review the District Court’s denial of the 
motions to intervene for abuse of discretion, “[w]hether an 
incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be 
reviewed de novo.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Initial Pub. 
Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
Whether the presumption applies pre-certification is just such 
an issue. 
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in In re Community Bank for a class action at a different stage 
than the one before us, we agree with Appellants that the 
rationale that animated the presumption in In re Community 
Bank applies with equal force in the pre-certification context. 
 That rationale was that members of a class have no 
“duty to take note of the suit or to exercise any responsibility 
with respect to it” until “the existence and limits of the class 
have been established and notice of membership has been 
sent.”  418 F.3d at 314 (quoting McKowan Lowe & Co. v. 
Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 384 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Those 
concerns for fair notice and the rights of persons who may 
otherwise be bound by the judgment in a class action carry 
just as much weight for putative class members before a court 
has ruled on class certification.  We thus decline to adopt the 
District Court’s bright-line rule distinguishing between pre- 
and post-certification motions to intervene.20  
                                              
 20 The District Court grounded its distinction between 
a putative and a certified class on a 1975 Supreme Court case 
in which the Court noted that “[w]hen [a] District Court 
certifie[s] the propriety of [a] class action, the class of 
unnamed persons described in the certification acquire[s] a 
legal status separate from the interest asserted by the 
appellant.”  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).  The 
Court in Sosna, however, was addressing whether a class 
action challenging certain Iowa residency requirements for 
divorce was moot once the named plaintiff had satisfied the 
residency requirement over the course of the litigation.  Its 
pronouncements in the context of mootness did not address 
the interests that give rise to the presumption of timeliness we 
recognized in In re Community Bank and do not suggest that 
the interests of putative class members seeking to intervene 
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 In addition to relying on In re Community Bank itself, 
Appellants contend that American Pipe & Construction Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), supports their position on the 
presumption of timeliness.  American Pipe established the 
rule that statutes of limitations toll while class certification 
motions are pending so that putative class members may 
await resolution of such motions and retain their ability to 
intervene in the event such motions for class certification are 
denied after the limitations period would have run on their 
individual claims.  See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 
545-53.  In crafting this rule, the Supreme Court sought to 
relieve putative class members of the need “to file earlier 
individual motions to join or intervene as parties,” because 
such “multiplicity of activity” would run contrary to two key 
goals of the class action device: efficiency and judicial 
economy.  Id. at 551. 
 While they do not directly cite American Pipe in their 
brief, Appellees invoke its reasoning by forewarning that 
extending the presumption to the pre-certification context 
would expose courts to endless intervention motions, 
clogging the courts with the very “multiplicity of activity” 
American Pipe sought to avoid.  Their point is well taken, and 
we cautioned in In re Community Bank that the presumption 
of timeliness should not be read to authorize a flurry of 
intervention or joinder motions unrelated to the merits of the 
class action because such a result would “seriously hamper[]” 
the “goals of Rule 23” as outlined in American Pipe.  418 
F.3d at 315.   
                                                                                                     
are so different from those of members of a certified class as 
to justify altering the presumption’s application. 
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 That word of warning, however, did not preclude our 
invocation of the presumption in In re Community Bank.  
And, as Appellants point out, without the presumption of 
timeliness, “class members would be compelled to intervene 
in every class action to protect their interests in the event the 
proposed class representatives are ultimately deemed 
inadequate”—giving rise to inefficiencies “[t]he class action 
device was designed to avoid . . . both before and after class 
certification.”  Reply Br. 16.  Denying the presumption to 
putative class members also could result in great 
inefficiencies and reductions in judicial economy in cases like 
the one before us, which would be dismissed after years of 
motion practice and discovery, only to be filed anew by 
plaintiffs who were unable to simply intervene and carry the 
motion for class certification through to its conclusion.  
Further, if the presumption of timeliness applied only to 
certified classes, then motions to intervene brought prior to 
class certification might be deemed untimely, even though 
those same motions would be timely if brought years later, 
after a class was certified.  The illogic of such result and the 
goals of efficiency and judicial economy emphasized by the 
Supreme Court in American Pipe militate that we extend the 
presumption of timeliness from In re Community Bank to the 
pre-certification context.  
 Not having had the benefit of our holding today, the 
District Court understandably failed to apply that presumption 
to Toledo Mack and JJRS’s motions to intervene.  As it turns 
out, however, that omission amounted to a misapplication of 
the law, which necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.  
In re GM Corp., 55 F.3d at 783.  Under these circumstances, 
we could remand for the District Court to apply the 
presumption in the first instance and determine whether it was 
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rebutted by the totality of the timeliness factors.  See, e.g., In 
re Cmty. Bank, 622 F.3d at 312-13.  However, where, as here, 
the totality of those factors points only to one conclusion—
that the presumption is not rebutted and the District Court 
erred in concluding two of the three factors weighed against 
timeliness—we may proceed to address those factors here.  
See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 712 
(3d Cir. 2004) (“Although a district court’s application of an 
incorrect legal standard ‘would normally result in a remand, 
we need not remand’ if application of the correct standard 
could support only one conclusion.” (quoting Duraco Prods., 
Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1451 (3d Cir. 
1994))).  For the sake of efficiency, we will proceed with that 
analysis here.   
C. The Timeliness Factors 
 The District Court concluded that all three of the 
timeliness factors weigh against Toledo Mack and JJRS’s 
motions to intervene.  Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 495-96.  In 
light of the presumption of timeliness, which necessarily 
raises the bar for a motion to intervene to be deemed 
untimely, and our conclusion that two of the three timeliness 
factors point strongly in favor of granting the motions, we 
will reverse the District Court’s denial of those motions. 
 As a threshold matter, we agree with the District Court 
that the first timeliness factor—the stage of the litigation—
counsels in favor of denial.  While this factor requires us to 
assess “what proceedings of substance on the merits have 
occurred,” rather than considering “[t]he mere passage of 
time,” Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n, 72 F.3d at 369, we are 
satisfied that the proceedings here were advanced.  Unlike in 
Mountain Top Condominium Ass’n, where there had been “no 
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depositions taken, dispositive motions filed, or decrees 
entered during the four year period in question,” id. at 370, 
the litigants here had briefed (and resolved) a dispositive 
motion to dismiss, undertaken “extensive fact discovery,” 
briefed the motion to certify the class, and submitted expert 
reports and depositions before the motions to intervene were 
filed, see Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 495.  While Appellants 
pose some arguments to the contrary,21 we agree with the 
District Court that, on balance, the extensive briefing and 
years-long discovery already completed by the time the 
motions to intervene were filed rendered the suit sufficiently 
advanced to weigh against granting said motions.  
 However, the other two timeliness factors—reason for 
delay and prejudice to the parties—point decisively in the 
opposite direction, leading to the inexorable conclusion that 
the totality of the circumstances supported granting the 
motions to intervene.22  In assessing whether there was a 
legitimate reason for the proposed intervenors’ purported 
                                              
 21 For example, Appellants point out that discovery 
was ongoing in some respects, summary judgment had not yet 
been briefed, the parties were a year away from trial, and that 
they would not request additional discovery; at most, they 
argue, “intervention would have required [Appellees] to 
produce documents and possibly sit for two depositions.”  
Appellants’ Br. 26-27.   
 
 22 Although a different sequence than that we provided 
in In re Community Bank, 418 F.3d at 314, we opt here to 
address the reason for delay factor before the prejudice factor 
because our conclusions as to the former inform the latter. 
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delay in filing their motions, we consider the extent of the 
delay and whether there was good reason for it. 
 Our standard to measure any purported delay is clear: 
“To the extent the length of time an applicant waits before 
applying for intervention is a factor in determining timeliness, 
it should be measured from the point at which the applicant 
knew, or should have known, of the risk to its rights.”  United 
States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1183 (3d Cir. 
1994); accord Benjamin, 701 F.3d at 950 (“The delay should 
be measured from the time the proposed intervenor knows or 
should have known of the alleged risks to his or her rights or 
the purported representative’s shortcomings.” (emphasis 
added)).  Less clear, and the subject of vigorous dispute 
between the parties, is when this point occurred. 
Appellees insist that Toledo Mack and JJRS knew or 
should have known Tauro’s direct purchaser standing was at 
risk as of the August 2014 interrogatories that inquired 
whether R&R’s assignment was supported by valid 
consideration or the November 2014 depositions related to 
such interrogatories.  The District Court agreed, concluding 
that the August interrogatories and November depositions 
were the proper “yardstick” from which the assess timeliness 
because the “caliber of representation and the significant 
amount of discovery” meant that the proposed intervenors 
“should have become aware of potential challenges to the 
standing of the named class representatives” at that time.  
Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 495-96.  Appellees’ argument 
relies heavily on the fact that Toledo Mack and JJRS were 
represented by the same counsel as Tauro, implying that 
counsel’s knowledge of the interrogatories should be imputed 
to Toledo Mack and JJRS.  Appellees further contend that 
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even if January 2015 is the proper benchmark, two months 
was an unreasonable delay. 
 Appellants, on the other hand, contend that the letter 
that Appellees submitted to the District Court in January 
2015, seeking leave to file a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing, is the moment they were first made aware of 
the possibility that Tauro would be dropped from the suit, and 
they aver they were confident in the validity of the 
assignment until that time.  From that vantage point, they 
argue, the delay of two months until Toledo Mack’s March 6 
motion to intervene—filed on the same day Tauro itself filed 
its reply brief to Appellees’ standing challenge—and two-plus 
months for JJRS’s March 24 motion were not meaningful 
delays.  
We agree with Appellants that the interrogatories and 
depositions, directed as they were at Tauro, should not be 
viewed as having put Toledo Mack and JJRS—or the counsel 
they shared with Tauro—on notice of the need to intervene as 
class representatives, and thus August and November 2014 
did not start the running of the hourglass.  Moreover, even 
accepting Appellees’ theory of imputed knowledge, the 
interrogatories at issue were phrased in general terms, and 
only two of the twenty-nine questions posed to Appellants in 
August 2014 were related to the validity of R&R’s 
assignment; similarly, only a small fraction of the November 
depositions raised questions about whether consideration was 
exchanged.  It cannot be said that general questions about the 
assignment should have triggered concerns about Tauro’s 
standing sufficient to induce counsel to find alternative 
plaintiffs, particularly where Appellees had not challenged 
the validity of the assignment over the course of the 
preceding five years, including in their 2010 motion to 
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dismiss the suit.  Cf. Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n, 72 F.2d at 
370 (affirming grant of motion to intervene in part where 
plaintiffs alleged they had “reasonably concluded” their 
money was safe for a long time and took prompt action once 
they were informed otherwise, even though it was late in the 
grand scheme of the lawsuit (emphasis added)).  At base, 
timeliness cannot hinge on requiring litigants and their 
attorneys to divine the intent behind each of their opponent’s 
questions in discovery and defensively file motions based on 
conceivable uses their answers might provide. 23  We 
                                              
 23 Appellants make two additional observations, upon 
which we need not rely.  First, they urge that the 
interrogatories and depositions were not public documents, 
meaning Toledo Mack and JJRS had no way of being put on 
notice regarding their contents (and the concomitant risk to 
the class action) and further supporting a later date as the 
proper benchmark.  While lack of access to these documents 
would be a legitimate additional reason to reject the 
interrogatories and depositions as the relevant moment in 
time, we need not and do not rely on this fact, which was not 
made plain in the record.  Second, for the first time in their 
reply brief on appeal, Appellants assert that Toledo Mack and 
JJRS did not retain class counsel until after Appellees filed 
their response to Appellants’ motion for class certification in 
late January 2015 (which included Appellees’ challenge to 
Tauro’s standing), implying that the proposed intervenors 
were ignorant of any risk to the litigation until that time.  
Appellees retort that Toledo Mack and JJRS fail to explain 
whether they had previous contact with Tauro’s counsel 
before retaining him for the intervention motions that would 
have put them on notice of the risk to Tauro’s standing and 
that counsel’s knowledge of the potential risks to Tauro’s 
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conclude, therefore, that the earliest moment at which Toledo 
Mack and JJRS were on notice of the serious risk that the 
named representative might lack standing was the submission 
of Appellees’ January 2015 letter advising of their intent to 
challenge the validity of R&R’s assignment.   
Appellees rely on NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 
366-67 (1973), to argue that the two months that elapsed 
between the January letter and Toledo Mack’s motion to 
intervene nonetheless amounted to an unreasonable delay.  
We disagree.  While the Court there did affirm a denial of a 
motion to intervene filed three weeks after the intervenors 
claimed to have become aware of the issue in that case, its 
rationale was tied more to the stage of the litigation factor, 
not the reason for delay factor.  In addition, the NAACP in 
that case had strong reason to believe the case was going to 
imminently come to an end because the United States 
government—the opposing party—was expected to consent 
to entry of summary judgment.  See id.  Here, Toledo Mack 
and JJRS had no reason to suspect Tauro would capitulate to 
the challenge to its standing, and it was therefore reasonable 
for them to file their motions to intervene alongside Tauro’s 
reply.  
 Moreover, here, the District Court specifically directed 
Appellees to brief their standing challenge in their response to 
Appellants’ motion for class certification, making it all the 
more reasonable for the proposed intervenors to seek to 
intervene in conjunction with Tauro’s reply.  Given that 
Tauro, Toledo Mack, and JJRS were all represented by the 
                                                                                                     
standing should be imputed to Toledo Mack and JJRS in any 
event.  We decline to consider these arguments, as they are 
not based on facts in the record. 
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same counsel and that the District Court had expressed a clear 
preference for the issues to be consolidated, intervenors did 
not unduly delay in filing their motions in coordination with 
Tauro’s reply rather than filing them piecemeal. 
 The District Court’s erroneous assessment of the 
alleged delay in this case also infected its analysis of 
prejudice.  District Courts are instructed to assess the 
prejudice that would befall either party that is “attributable to 
any time delay.”  Mountain Top Condo. Ass’n, 72 F.3d at 
370.  Having concluded there was no meaningful delay here, 
we are skeptical of the alleged prejudice to Appellees.  The 
grounds identified by the District Court do not, in any event, 
withstand scrutiny.   
 The District Court concluded that “allowing 
intervention at this stage in the litigation would require re-
opening discovery to explore the suitability of the intervening 
plaintiffs as a class representatives [sic] and re-briefing class 
certification issues specific to the intervening plaintiffs.”  
Wallach, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 496.  But Appellants have not 
sought to re-open discovery or re-brief class certification, and 
additional discovery Appellees may require would be limited 
to Toledo Mack and JJRS’s standing, typicality, and 
adequacy as class representatives.  The District Court further 
stated that Appellees “would additionally be required to 
respond to the proposed complaint.  After five years of 
litigation, these additional hurdles will result in further delays 
as well as burdensome costs to the defendants.”  Wallach, 125 
F. Supp. 3d at 496.  But Appellees did not bring their 
challenge to Tauro’s standing until five years into the 
litigation, thereby bringing upon themselves any prejudice 
stemming from late-arising additional answers and discovery 
on Toledo Mack and JJRS’s adequacy to serve as class 
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representatives.  On balance, then, because there was no 
significant delay from which prejudice could stem and 
because the nature of the burdens facing Appellees does not 
amount to significant prejudice, this factor, too, weighs in 
favor of granting the motions to intervene. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that the totality of the 
timeliness factors clearly weighs in favor of granting Toledo 
Mack and JJRS’s motions to intervene and cannot rebut the 
presumption of timeliness the District Court erroneously 
failed to afford to those motions.  Because the District Court 
applied the wrong legal standard and misapplied the law to 
the facts, it abused its discretion in denying them.  See In re 
GM Corp., 55 F.3d at 783. 
V. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s decisions to dismiss Tauro for lack of standing, 
to deny Toledo Mack and JJRS’s motions to intervene as 
class representatives, and to—as a result—dismiss 
Appellants’ motion for class certification for lack of Article 
III standing.  In light of these reversals, we will remand this 
case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
